Kingsley replaced three decades of confused doctrine with a single rule: pretrial detainees need only show that force was objectively unreasonable, not that officers acted with subjective malice. The implications extend well beyond the moment of force.
Doctrinal Framing
Before Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), the Circuits were fractured on the standard governing excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Some circuits—including the Seventh Circuit before Kingsley—required a showing that officers acted with a "subjective" improper state of mind, importing the malicious-and-sadistic standard from Eighth Amendment prisoner cases. Others applied an objective-reasonableness standard analogous to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). The Supreme Court resolved the split in Kingsley by holding squarely that pretrial detainees need only show that force was "objectively unreasonable"—measured from the perspective of a reasonable officer with the defendant's knowledge—without any showing of subjective intent to harm.
The significance of this distinction is not merely academic. A subjective standard requires plaintiffs to prove what the officer was actually thinking—typically through circumstantial evidence, officer testimony, and expert opinion on reasonable police practices. An objective standard asks only what a reasonable officer in the same situation would have done. The latter is demonstrably easier to establish, particularly through video evidence, use-of-force expert testimony, and comparison to departmental policy.
The Kingsley Decision
Michael Kingsley was a pretrial detainee in a Wisconsin county jail who was physically removed from his cell after refusing to comply with officers' instructions regarding a paper covering his light fixture. Officers handcuffed him, removed him forcibly, and a Taser was applied to his back for approximately five seconds after he was face-down on a bunk. The officers maintained that Kingsley resisted the removal; Kingsley maintained that they slammed his head into a concrete bunk.
At trial, the district court instructed the jury that Kingsley was required to prove that the officers "recklessly disregarded [Kingsley's] safety" and "acted with reckless disregard of [his] rights"—a formulation incorporating a subjective element. The jury found for the officers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the correct standard required subjective inquiry into the officers' state of mind.
The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision by Justice Breyer, vacated and remanded. The Court's holding rests on the fundamental constitutional distinction between pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners:
- Convicted prisoners are subject to punishment lawfully imposed following conviction. Their Eighth Amendment claims require proof that officials acted with "deliberate indifference" (conditions/medical care) or "maliciously and sadistically" (force used to suppress a disturbance)—both subjective standards reflecting the punitive nature of the sentence.
- Pretrial detainees cannot be punished at all. Their due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment protect them against any intentional force that is not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose, or that is excessive in relation to that purpose. This formulation, drawn from Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), does not require proof of punitive intent—only objective excess.
The Kingsley Court identified a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to the objective-reasonableness inquiry:
- the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;
- the extent of the plaintiff's injury;
- any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force;
- the severity of the security problem at issue;
- the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
- whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.
576 U.S. at 397. This list closely parallels, but is not identical to, the Graham factors applicable to Fourth Amendment excessive force claims against free citizens. The Kingsley factors incorporate the institutional context of a jail—the legitimate interest in maintaining order—rather than focusing solely on the seizure context.
The Objective vs. Subjective Standard: Practical Implications
The shift from subjective to objective standard has concrete litigation consequences:
Summary judgment. Under a subjective standard, defendants could often survive summary judgment by submitting declarations attesting to their reasonable good-faith belief that force was necessary—even against contradictory video evidence—because the inquiry turned on the officers' actual state of mind, and credibility was a jury question. Under an objective standard, the inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have used the same force; that is a legal question that courts can resolve on summary judgment when the record is clear.
Jury instructions. Kingsley makes clear that jury instructions asking whether the officer "intended" to harm the plaintiff, "acted maliciously," or "had a legitimate purpose" are erroneous in the pretrial detainee context if they ask about the officer's subjective state. Post-Kingsley instructions should ask only whether the force, viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer with the same information, was objectively unreasonable.
Qualified immunity. Even after Kingsley, defendants will assert qualified immunity by arguing that no clearly established law put them on notice that the specific force used against a compliant or semi-compliant pretrial detainee was unconstitutional. Post-Kingsley cases have expanded the body of clearly established law in the pretrial detainee context, making it harder for defendants to claim they lacked fair warning.
Application Beyond Force: Conditions and Medical Claims
Kingsley's holding was expressly limited to excessive force claims by pretrial detainees. But the opinion's reasoning—that the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees against any intentional government action that is not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose—has fueled ongoing litigation over whether the objective standard extends to other types of constitutional claims brought by pretrial detainees:
Conditions of confinement. Several circuits (Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth) have held that Kingsley extends to conditions-of-confinement claims: a pretrial detainee who claims that jail conditions are unconstitutional need not prove that officials were subjectively aware of and deliberately indifferent to those conditions, but only that the conditions were objectively unreasonable under Bell v. Wolfish. Other circuits (Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh) have declined to extend Kingsley beyond excessive force.
Medical care claims. The same circuit split exists for inadequate-medical-care claims. The objective standard makes it meaningfully easier for pretrial detainees to prevail: under the Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference standard, a plaintiff must prove the official subjectively knew of and disregarded a serious medical need. Under the Kingsley objective standard, the plaintiff need only show that the failure to provide care was objectively unreasonable.
Eleventh Circuit Application: Wade v. McDade and Its Limits
In the Eleventh Circuit, the reach of Kingsley is an active battleground. The circuit's en banc decision in Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251 (11th Cir. 2024), is primarily an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference case governing convicted prisoner medical claims—not a pretrial detainee case—but its articulation of the subjective-recklessness standard for deliberate indifference underscores the Eleventh Circuit's resistance to importing the Kingsley objective standard beyond excessive force. Wade held that deliberate-indifference plaintiffs must show the defendant was "subjectively aware that his own conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm"—a formulation that expressly requires subjective knowledge, not merely objective unreasonableness. 106 F.4th at 1261.
This means that in the Eleventh Circuit, practitioners must carefully distinguish claim type:
- Pretrial detainee excessive force claims — governed by Kingsley's objective standard.
- Pretrial detainee conditions of confinement and medical care claims — the Eleventh Circuit has not extended Kingsley to these claims and continues to apply a standard coextensive with the Eighth Amendment subjective standard for convicted prisoners.
The ongoing circuit split makes this a certiorari-worthy question, and practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit should preserve arguments for Kingsley extension while acknowledging controlling circuit precedent.
Practice Notes
Pleading. In the Eleventh Circuit, plead pretrial detainee force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause with explicit reference to Kingsley's objective standard. Separately plead conditions and medical claims under both the objective and subjective standards to preserve both theories pending circuit resolution.
Discovery. The Kingsley factors invite discovery into departmental use-of-force policies, officer training, and the security concerns the officer invoked at the time of force. If the officer's force exceeded the department's own policy standards, that gap is strong circumstantial evidence of objective unreasonableness.
Expert testimony. Police practices experts should address whether the force used was consistent with widely accepted police training—including whether the force was proportionate to the security threat presented. Courts in the Eleventh Circuit admit such testimony under Daubert when the expert is qualified in law enforcement training and the opinion is based on disclosed methodology.
Jury trial strategy. The objective standard means that jury instructions should not invite sympathy-mitigation for an officer who "did his best" or "made a mistake." The question is whether the force was objectively reasonable, and counsel should discipline the framing accordingly.
Closing
Kingsley is one of the most plaintiff-favorable § 1983 excessive force decisions of the past quarter century. Its application is well-settled for force claims by pretrial detainees; its extension to other Fourteenth Amendment claims remains contested, particularly in the Eleventh Circuit. Counsel who master the doctrinal landscape—and who preserve arguments on the open questions—will be best positioned as the law continues to develop.
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Informational only. Not legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this post. Consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction.