The Eleventh Circuit's 2022 en banc decision in Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Management Services, Inc. did not merely resolve a standing dispute about mail vendors. It recalibrated the entire Eleventh Circuit's approach to Article III standing in FDCPA cases, making it the most consequential consumer-finance standing decision in the circuit since TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. Practitioners bringing FDCPA claims in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida courts—state or federal—must understand what Hunstein did and did not hold, and how to plead around it.
I. Doctrinal Framing
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, prohibits "debt collectors" from using abusive, unfair, or deceptive practices to collect debts. Congress gave consumers a private right of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, which authorizes recovery of actual damages, statutory damages of up to $1,000 for individual plaintiffs (or the greater of $500,000 or one percent of the defendant's net worth in class actions), and attorney's fees for successful plaintiffs.
The question that Hunstein addressed—and that has dominated FDCPA practice for the last four years—is whether a plaintiff who pleads a statutory FDCPA violation has necessarily suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish Article III standing. The answer, post-Hunstein, is decidedly no in the Eleventh Circuit.
II. The Hunstein Procedural History
Understanding Hunstein requires tracking its unusual procedural journey through the Eleventh Circuit, which includes multiple opinions spanning three years.
A. The Underlying Facts
Richard Hunstein incurred a medical debt for his son's treatment and the debt was assigned to Preferred Collection & Management Services. Preferred used a third-party commercial mail vendor, Compumail, to prepare, print, and mail collection letters. In transmitting information to Compumail, Preferred disclosed Hunstein's name, the amount of the debt, the medical provider to whom the debt was owed, and the fact that it related to his son's medical treatment. Hunstein alleged that this disclosure violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which prohibits a debt collector from communicating "in connection with the collection of any debt" with any person other than the consumer, the consumer's attorney, a credit reporting agency, and certain others.
The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Hunstein appealed.
B. The First Panel Opinion (April 2021)
On April 21, 2021, an Eleventh Circuit panel reversed. Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2021). The panel held: (1) Hunstein had Article III standing because his allegations of unlawful disclosure to a third party were sufficiently analogous to the common-law tort of public disclosure of private facts; and (2) the transmission of Hunstein's personal information to a mail vendor "in connection with the collection" of the debt was a § 1692c(b) violation. The panel declined to require a demand for payment as a predicate for "in connection with" liability.
The first panel decision created immediate industry disruption. Creditors and debt collectors rethought their outsourcing arrangements, and plaintiffs' counsel filed a wave of analogous § 1692c(b) actions.
C. TransUnion and the Substitute Opinion (October 2021)
Between the first panel opinion and en banc review, the Supreme Court decided TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), which tightened the standing analysis for statutory violations by holding that an injury-in-fact for Article III purposes must be "concrete"—not merely an "abstract," technical statutory violation. TransUnion required courts to ask whether the alleged statutory harm "has a close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts."
In October 2021, the Hunstein panel vacated its April opinion and issued a substitute opinion that attempted to preserve the same outcome in light of TransUnion. The substitute opinion held that Preferred's disclosure was sufficiently analogous to the public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort because courts have recognized that small-scale disclosures can still invade privacy. A sharply worded dissent by Judge Tjoflat argued the substitute opinion was inconsistent with TransUnion.
D. En Banc Grant and Oral Argument
On November 22, 2021, the full Eleventh Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc. Oral argument was held in February 2022.
E. The En Banc Decision (September 8, 2022)
The en banc court reversed the panel, holding that Hunstein lacked Article III standing. Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 19-14434 (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2022) (en banc). Judge Grant wrote the majority opinion, joined by seven other judges. Chief Judge Pryor concurred. Judge Newsom—who had authored the original panel decision—dissented at length.
The court vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.
The en banc majority applied TransUnion's two-step framework: (1) identify the nature of the harm alleged; (2) ask whether it bears a "close relationship" to a harm traditionally cognizable at common law. Applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts' definition of "publicity," the court held that Preferred's disclosure to a single mail-vendor entity—without any showing that information was distributed to, or likely to be seen by, the public—did not constitute the kind of "public" disclosure of private facts that American courts have traditionally recognized as actionable. The difference, the court emphasized, is qualitative, not merely quantitative: one company receiving information in the course of a business relationship is categorically different from public exposure.
The majority's key holding: "[Hunstein] is simply no worse off because [Preferred] delegated the task of populating data into a form letter to a mail vendor. . . . No concrete harm, no standing." Slip op. at citation omitted.
III. TransUnion v. Ramirez and the FDCPA Standing Framework
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), provides the controlling analytical framework for FDCPA standing in all federal courts. The Court held in a 5-4 decision that a class of plaintiffs whose credit files contained inaccurate OFAC designations suffered different standing fates depending on whether their files had actually been disseminated to third-party creditors. Only those class members whose inaccurate files had been sent to creditors had suffered a "concrete" injury analogous to the common-law tort of defamation. The remaining plaintiffs—whose files were maintained internally with the inaccuracy but not sent to anyone—had no standing.
TransUnion established several principles that now govern FDCPA standing:
- Statutory violations are insufficient. A plaintiff must allege more than that a defendant violated a statute. Congress cannot manufacture Article III standing by declaring a statutory harm to be a legal injury. Courts must independently assess concreteness.
- Common-law analogy is the test. Whether a claimed harm is concrete depends on whether it bears a close enough relationship to a harm traditionally recognized in American courts. Courts look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and common-law precedents.
- Risk of real-world harm. Even without a present, tangible injury, a plaintiff may establish standing by showing a sufficient risk of real harm materialized from the statutory violation. But a "risk of injury" that never materialized and caused no actual harm does not automatically satisfy concreteness.
IV. Post-Hunstein FDCPA Standing in the Eleventh Circuit
A. What Hunstein Left Standing
The en banc decision was limited in important ways. The court explicitly did not hold that § 1692c(b) is unenforceable or that mail-vendor disclosures are never actionable. Rather, it held only that this plaintiff, on these facts, failed to plead a concrete injury in the specific form alleged. A plaintiff who can allege and prove that a debt collector's disclosure to a third party resulted in actual public exposure, actual reputational harm, emotional distress proximately traceable to the disclosure, or a tangible downstream consequence retains a viable FDCPA claim.
B. Categories of FDCPA Claims With Stronger Standing
Post-Hunstein, FDCPA claims supported by the following facts tend to have more defensible Article III standing:
- Actual dissemination. Where the debtor's information was disclosed to multiple parties, published on the internet, shared with a credit reporting agency, or otherwise disseminated beyond a single business relationship, the public-disclosure analogy is substantially stronger.
- Emotional distress. Plaintiffs who suffered documented, diagnosable emotional distress—not merely subjective discomfort—have a tangible injury that satisfies TransUnion without relying on the common-law analogy.
- Tangible economic harm. Denial of credit, a higher interest rate, or a concrete financial consequence traceable to the FDCPA violation is concrete injury.
- False representations in collection communications. Claims under § 1692e (false, deceptive, or misleading representations) and § 1692f (unfair practices) arising from what the debt collector said to the plaintiff—as opposed to what it disclosed to a third party—do not implicate the public-disclosure standing problem at all, because the harm flows directly to the consumer.
C. State Court as Alternative Forum
The en banc opinion itself noted that Article III standing requirements do not apply in state court. FDCPA claims may be brought in state court under § 1692k, and state courts are not bound by federal standing doctrine. This option is particularly valuable in Alabama (with its state consumer protection apparatus), Florida (where FCCPA dual claims are common), and Georgia. Plaintiffs whose federal claims founder on Hunstein standing grounds should evaluate state-court filing.
V. Practice Notes: Pleading Concrete Harm
Specificity over generality. Post-Hunstein, a complaint that alleges only that the defendant "transmitted information to a third party in violation of § 1692c(b)" without more will face a standing motion. Complaints should specifically identify: (1) who received the information; (2) whether it was disseminated further; (3) what actual harm resulted; and (4) how that harm maps onto a recognized common-law tort or a category of tangible injury.
Emotional distress allegations. Courts have permitted emotional distress claims to satisfy the concreteness requirement, but plaintiffs must plead the distress with sufficient factual detail. Vague assertions of "anxiety" or "stress" are insufficient; plaintiffs should identify the nature, duration, and functional impact of the distress and connect it causally to the defendant's specific conduct.
Document the common-law analog carefully. When relying on the public-disclosure-of-private-facts analogy, practitioners should identify what information was disclosed, to how many entities, with what probability that individuals within those entities would access it, and whether any downstream dissemination occurred. The qualitative character of the disclosure—not its mere existence—determines standing under Hunstein.
Consider parallel FCCPA claims. In Florida, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. ch. 559, Part VI, applies to a broader range of collectors than the FDCPA and does not require the plaintiff to navigate the same federal standing analysis. Dual FDCPA/FCCPA pleading allows plaintiffs to hedge against standing challenges.
FDCPA statute of limitations. The FDCPA has a one-year statute of limitations from the date of the violation, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Clients seeking legal advice about debt-collection conduct should be consulted promptly.
VI. Open Questions
The Hunstein decision is not the end of FDCPA standing litigation in the Eleventh Circuit. Several issues remain open:
- Risk of harm standing. The en banc court did not foreclose standing based on a significant risk of real harm that never materialized. Lower courts continue to grapple with how much risk is sufficient.
- Standing for § 1692e claims. The public-disclosure analogy is unnecessary where the FDCPA violation consists of false statements in the debt-collection communication itself. These claims are analytically distinct from Hunstein and remain viable without additional standing allegations.
- State-court FDCPA litigation. The wave of FDCPA litigation moving to state court post-Hunstein has not yet generated a significant body of state appellate authority. Practitioners in Alabama and Florida state courts have an opportunity to develop favorable state-court precedents on FDCPA claims.
VII. Closing
Hunstein did not kill the FDCPA in the Eleventh Circuit. It did require plaintiffs' counsel to think more carefully about standing from the complaint stage, to plead concrete harm with particularity, and to consider state court as an alternative forum. Those adjustments are achievable with disciplined pleading practice. The debt-collection industry's widespread use of third-party vendors creates ongoing opportunities to identify FDCPA violations that cause the kind of tangible, real-world harm that TransUnion and Hunstein require—plaintiffs' counsel who can document that harm will continue to vindicate consumer rights under the statute.
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Informational only. Not legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this post. Consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction.